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ABSTRACT
The Representation of Relational Information
in Long Term Memory-
February, 1979
Judy McKinley Brewer, B.A., University of California
M.S., University of Massachusetts,
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor James Chumbley
The memorial information used to judge the relative
sizes of two named objects was investigated in a sentence-
verification task in which ordinal and semantic distance
relationships between the judged items were varied ortho-
gonally. Test sentences were constructed using four sev-
en item subsets of familiar object names drawn from a
pre-experimentally ordered twelve item master list. Tra-
ditional qualitative analysis mirrored previous findings
that reaction time and errors appeared to be affected by
ordinal attributes of the items on the judged dimension.
Planned contrasts, however, revealed that judgement time
and accaracy were predicted only by the semantic (analog)
relationships between the judged items. Use of a tempor-
ary linear memory array was ruled out and an argument was
iv
Vmade that analog relational information was the basis for
these memorial comparisons. Both an analog reference-
point model and a semantic coding model were found to be
adequate to describe the comparative judgement process in
this task. However, the data suggested that the descrip-
tions of the memory search and code generation processes
proposed by the semantic coding model need refinement.
Constraints on the selection of reference-points are also
discussed. The findings provide evidence that continuous
analog information is available in the long-term memory
representation and that analog relationships are utilized
in performing memorial comparisons based on real-world
knowledge
.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
How is it that we know the size, shape, color,
disease resistance, or keeping quality of an apple?
This study concerns the representation of attributes
in human memory. In particular, it investigates how
information about a certain type of dimension"'" which we
shall refer to as "continuous" is coded in memory.
Human memory is not adapted for exact reproduc-
tion of previous events, but has the capability of ab-
stracting the general form of events (Bartlett, 1932)
and of representing them such that we can use them to
act intelligently in the future. In the natural world,
no two events or objects are exactly the same. The ab-
stractive nature of memory allows us a flexibility neces-
sary for intelligent operation in this dynamic environment.
Of course, the abstraction itself is originally formed
of instances, instances chosen from the real world, and
we do seem to retain some information relevant to individu-
al instances (Hebb, 1949; Reed, 1972) . However, the way
in which we choose, and represent, the attributes of the
instances will determine what concepts may be formed
around them. Thus a complete understanding of the
means by which we behave rationally, our cognitive
processing, requires that we understand the representa-
tion of attribute information in memory (cf. Arbib,
1972; Minsky, 1975)
.
Most physical attributes are perceptually continu-
ous. For instance, the possible colors of apples range
from green through yellow to red. Although we might
symbolize the color attribute of a particular apple by
calling it "red," we can also say that the "red" of a
Russet apple is very different ("more towards the yellow")
from the "red" of a Macintosh. Likewise, the possible
sizes of apples vary indefinitely between the size of a
golfball and the size of a Softball. The size di-
mension is "continuous" because there are an infinite
number of possible magnitudes within any particular range.
When we consider the abstractive nature of human memory,
it is most tempting to assume that these qualities are
also coded in memory and processed in a continuous,
or analog2 form. There are several reasons to reconsider
this assumption, which will be discussed in terms of
major classes of models proposed to describe the cognitive
processing of continuous dimensional information.
Most of the data relevant to these models comes
from studies of comparative judgement. These studies
attempt to specify the nature of the cognitive repre-
sentation and processing of certain ordered (or orderable)
relationships. Especially, the focus of much experimental
work has been on representation of linear orderings. Re-
lated tasks include inference, set inclusion, categorical
judgements and others. Although we might think that the
real-world applicability of linear ordering studies would
be limited, DeSoto (1961, 1965) and others have demon-
strated that linear orderings characterize many aspects
of human judgement. We often act "as if" we were using
universally useful unidimensional lists, even when making
multidimensional judgements. In the standard comparative
judgement task (cf. Potts, Banks, Kosslyn, Moyer and
Smith, 1978) , a subject is presented with a pair of items
and then is asked to select the one which represents more
or less of a particular attribute. For instance, the
subject might see words or pictures representing a dog
and a horse and be asked to decide quickly which is small-
er. Alternatively, the subject may judge the truth of
a stated comparative relation (e.g., "The dog is smaller
than the horse"). The normal means of measuring this sort
of reasoning is through the reaction time (RT or accuracy
of the subject. The time required to answer various
qestions pertaining to the relations, and the errors in
making these decisions, are examined for recurrent pat-
terns.
We are most interested in the competencies humans
have for dealing with the world, in symbolizing aspects
of the world and in representing concepts in memory. Our
ultimate goal is development of a generally useful model
of these competencies. For this purpose, patterns found
across subjects and experimental tasks are most helpful.
Knowledge of the way humans deal with linear orderings
is, in itself, useful, but we want to avoid results and
models that are peculiar to arbitrary and/or artificial
settings
.
In order to be truly viable, then, any model of
comparative judgement, especially one based on linear
orderings, must speak to other notions of memory and
other tasks. It must deal with robust effects over
experiments and be extendable, at least inferentially if
not specifically, to areas such as perception and
general semantic memory. Secondly, it is preferable that
3It be intuitively believable. Parsimony is a primary
factor in credibility; a model which necessitates numerous
ad hoc additions quickly falls from the ranks of serious
consideration. With these limits, two classes of models
emerge as generally accepted and useful.
Models of Memorial Comparison
The two model classes of interest do not necessari-
ly differ in describing how a perceived event is stored,
but rather in the conception of how it is processed
.
"Perceptual" models assume that the representation used
to make a decision is in a continuous form, possibly
similar to that of the original percept. "Linguistic"
models assume that discrete codes, like those of natural
language, are used to make comparative decisions.
Perceptual models
. The perceptual models assert that
the information used in the decision process is similar
to that available in the actual physical object as per-
ceived. Thus information available in a continuous form
in the physical world is also available in a continuous
form in memory and is used in that form in processing
(cf
. Potts et al.
,
1978)
.
A major impetus in the formation of the models as
they now stand was the discovery of an interesting paral-
lel between perceptual and memorial comparison. Things
close together on a physical dimension (differing only
slightly in magnitude) are harder to "see as different"
than things far apart (differing greatly in magnitude).
For instance, it is easy to select the dimmer of two
lights when one is quite dim and one is very intense.
The decision is far more difficult if both of the lights
are rather dim, one being only slightly dimmer than the
other (Welford, 1960) .
Moyerand Landauer (1967) pointed out that this
effect can be found for memorial distance as well— the
ease with which we can discriminate between stored di-
mensional values seems to reflect the subjective dif-
ference between the magnitudes of such values. Moyer and
Bayer (1976) titled this the "symbolic distance effect,"
to differentiate it from the case in which the referent
objects or events are actually present. The effect is
quite robust, and has been obtained for several memorial
continua (e.g., digits, Buckley and Gilman, 1974; animal
size, Moyer, 1973; object size, Paivio, 1975; McKinley,
1975)
.
Moyer (1973) first made the suggestion that the
parallel between the perceptual and memorial conditions
was due to an "internal psychophysics " involved in
memorial processing. While such a process seems highly
plausible, it has proven difficult to define in precise
terms. If confusion processes are similar, what sort
of internal representation could support a process
similar to that of perception?
Perceptual models opt for the most likely candi-
date and assume that images or analog codes are used
and that these are at least second-order isomorphic^ to
continuous representations. If the information is treated
directly in its analog form, then processing could
1) be similar to "seeing internally," giving rise to
image-processing models,^ or 2) not rely on imaginal
representation, necessarily, but use analog codes in some
alternate way to compute a similarity or commonality
judgement.
Paivio (1975) and Kosslyn (1975) have most clear-
ly delineated imagery models. Kosslyn (1975) described
more clearly what an image might be by describing what
it is not: it is not a "picture" in that a picture is
concrete, and in that figure-ground perception and
contour sharpening are needed for fundamental interpreta-
tion. Instead, images are preorganized into objects
and their properties, and are meaningful so that we
would not forget a random part as would be possible if
tearing off the corner of a picture. Although Pylyshyn
(1973) has leveled some strong arguments against the use
of the image as an explanatory construct, Kosslyn and
Pomerantz (1977) have published an eloquent and lengthy
reply, arguing that imagery accounts of several experimen-
tal findings are at least as adequate as those based on
prepositional representation. The reader is referred to
both papers for a more detailed discussion of the imagery
concept. For present purposes it seems sufficient to
present a representative set of assumptions used in
imagery accounts. The following assumptions were imple-
mented in a computer simulation of imagery by Kosslyn and
Schwartz (1978)
.
1) An image is spatial representation like that
underlying the experience of seeing an object during
visual perception. These images may be generated
from underlying abstract representations, but the
contents of these underlying representations are
accessible only via the generation of a surface
(experienced) image.
2) Only a finite processing capacity is available
for constructing and representing images. (Acti-
vated detail is limited.)
3) Images, once formed, are wholes that may be
compared to percepts in a template-like manner.
4) The same structures that represent spatial in-
9formation extracted during vision also support im-
ages
.
5) Many of the same operators (excluding peripheral
functions) that are used in analyzing percepts are
also applied to images.
Some subjective support of the image-processing mod-
els lies in the almost universal reports by subjects in
comparative judgement tasks that they envisioned, imag-
ined, or made a mental picture of the objects to be com-
pared.
Image-processing models do not directly explain com-
parative judgement by specifying any particular processes,
but simply state that the mechanisms used in memorial com-
parison are directly parallel to those used in perceptual
comparison of real objects. These mechanisms, it is as-
sumed, will remain undefined until we understand percep-
tion.
The alternatives to the image-processing models,
within the class of perceptual models, rely more heavily
on the continuous quality of the information utilized
than on the representation per se. Banks (1977) has re-
ferred to some of these as "analog continuum" models,
since they often assume that the mental representation
used is a continuum on which items are "placed" for pro-
cessing. However, models that claim people represent
10
continuous quantities need not claim that they place rep-
resentations on a continuum before making comparisons.
The defining features of such models are: 1) they do not
assume image-type representations, but 2) they do assume
that the information stored and used for processing is
continuous. The term "independent continuous" will be
used to denote models of this class. The comparison pro-
cess such models use is uniform in that "the information
retrieved at one point (in time) does not qualitatively
differ from information available at a different point"
(Holyoak, 1978). Information accumulation proceeds over
time, however, allowing increased precision.
Marks' (1972) "discriminal dispersion" model was an
early form of such a model, describing the information
used as distributions of subjective stimulus magnitudes.
More recently, Holyoak (1978) has carefully defined and
quantitatively tested a model described earlier by
Jamieson and Petrusic (1975) . A form of this reference
point model seems the most reasonable of the independent
continuous class, although a model proposed by Moyer and
Bayer (1976) which shares some qualities with the inde-
pendent continuous will be entertained in the final sec-
tion of this introduction.
The reference point model assumes that subjects com-
pare two stimuli by computing the ratio of the distance
11
of the first stimulus from a reference point to the
distance of the second stimulus from the reference point.
This "distance ratio" (or "discrepancy ratio" as Jamieson
and Petrusic referred to it) accounts for the symbolic
distance effect; the farther apart on the continuum two
stimuli are, the larger (smaller) the computed ratio will
be and the more quickly the decision may be reached. Re-
action time is assumed to decrease monotonically as the
ratio moves away from one.^ The ratio may be computed on
an analog scale and thus preserve the analog qualities
of the stimuli.
Holyoak (1978) suggests three stages, apart from
encoding and response, which are used in the decision
process: 1) a gross categorial stimulus-type evaluation
(in his particular evaluation, identifying the stimulus
as one in which the to-be-compared pair of items lay in
one dimensional direction from a reference point, or as
one in which the reference point fell between the items
on the dimension), 2) assessing the distance from each
comparison digit to the reference point, and 3) comparing
the two derived distances. The symbolic distance effect
could be affected by either stages 2 or 3 , but the scale
of measurement (e.g., linear or logarithmic) used in stage
2 for computing the distances v/ould determine directly
whether subjective magnitude differences would be reflect-
ed in the distance function.
Furthermore, if discrete values are retrieved, a
direct mental subtraction process could be used in stage
2 to compute specific distances which could be compared
in stage 3. But if an analog representation is used,
the stage 2 generation and stage 3 comparison processes
might be iterative, generating and comparing several
sample values.
If the continuous information in the images or ana-
log codes of perceptual models is converted to a discrete
form for processing, the line of reasoning implies that
actual perceptions are also processed in discrete codes,
since these two processes are seen to be analogous. A
model making these assumptions is indistinguishable from
Banks' linguistic model (1977).
Linguistic models
. The semantic coding model proposed
by Banks, Clark, and Lucy (197 5) and elaborated more
fully by Banks (1977) is the single best example of a
model which assumes that the representation used in a
comparative judgement is discrete. The fact that the
model provides an explicit account of memorial comparison
makes it especially attractive. Although several prepo-
sitional models available (Anderson and Bower, 1973;
Rumelhart, Lindsay, and Norman, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1973)
may well lead to alternate interpretations, no other
proposal so far extended has fared well enough to
be considered here (of. Banks, 1977, McKinley, 1975).
The primary assumption of the semantic coding model
is that discrete categorical tags are used in the com-
parison process. The components of the model are the
data base, generated codes, and a set of processing
mechanisms. The data base may be either temporary data
structures or semantic memory; and these data bases may
contain continuous information. Banks (1977) prefers to
limit analog memory representation to temporary data
structures (Banks, Fujii, and Kayra-Stu^rt
, 1976) if ad-
mitting it at all, but has not totally ruled out the
possibility of analog representation in the long-term
data bases. The generated codes, on the other hand, are
discrete linguistic codes (i.e., categorical tags) in all
cases. The processing mechanisms comprise three serial
stages which generate the codes and transform them in
order to make a choice. Figure 1 outlines the semantic
coding model and will be described in detail in the follow-
ing discussion. Note that there is a fourth stage "D"
which is the response component and has not yet been ex-
plicated by Banks and his colleagues.
14
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The first stage. A, is an encoding stage where
discrete codes are derived from sensory information by
consulting memory. it also generates similar discrete
codes directly from the memory representation. These
codes are used by all other stages of processing. The
second stage, marked B in the diagram, has most of the
power in controlling processing. This stage utilizes the
pair of codes generated by the first stage; it basically
"decides" whether the codes are adequate to distinguish
the stimuli. This stage has the power to be an active
problem-solver (e.g., to direct the coding stage), but
may in simple instances serve more as a passive buffer
(perhaps as a "counter" in the manner of accumulating
information)
.
it is this stage which is responsible for
the semantic distance effect; if items are close together
on a dimension, the codes initially generated to define
them are more likely to be the same and thus to be re-
jected by this discrimination stage as insufficient for
a choice. Increases in time to make a decision (RT) in
a difficult comparison reflect time required to accumulate
enough information to generate discriminable codes.
Banks describes this relationship as the availability
principle : the closer together two items are, the less
available will be any information which the discrimina-
tion process might use to distinguish between them. An
example provided by Banks (1977) suggests that items
may be easily distinguished if a third item which falls
between them on the dimension may be found. Although
this particular heuristic is not crucial to the general
viability of the coding model, it is a straightforward
and testable translation of the logic of the availability
principle and will thus be reviewed in detail later in
terms of the present experiment.
The third stage (C) , and final one of concern
here, matches the generated codes to the code for the
instructions. The instruction code is assumed to be
in the same form as the codes for the poles of the con-
tinuum; "pick the largest" is generated as a code of the
form "LARGE," or "pick L+ .
"
As previously mentioned, the data base (designated
on the diagram in Figure 1 as 1) has not been unequivo-
cally defined by Banks (1977), but he has made some
definite suggestions as to the alternatives he would
prefer to entertain. Recall that two types of data base
are proposed, a temporary one being used for a specific
task and a more permanent semantic memory.
Banks' model of the temporary data base assumes a
strategy in which subjects "place" items on a special
scale useful for a particular task. An analog continuum,
such as that described by Shepard, Kilpatric and Cunning-
ess
17
ham (1975, pp. 130-135) would basically parallel the
type of continuum suggested by some of the independent
continuous models-with the difference that codes would
be generated from the representation rather than proc
ing proceeding directly with the analog information.
Alternatively, an ordinal "scaffold" (suggested by
Bower, 1971) might be developed by placing items on a
scale using their analog attributes, if appropriate,
and then discarding or otherwise "forgetting" the
analog relationships while retaining the representation
of the ordinal relationships. Although either of these
temporary data structures could represent interval-scale
information (by frequency, DeSoto and Bosley, 1962; by
spacing, Moyer and Landauer, 1967; by modifiers, Potts,
1974a, 1975; or by strengths of representation or
association on the continuum, Trabasso and Riley, 1975)
it is the ordinal qualities which would be the most pre-
dominant through effects on coding facility (cf. Minsky,
1975 for his discussion of symbolic descriptions) . Or-
dinal position on the scale would provide the most readi
ly available information for generation of categorical
codes which could be compared. It is this quality which
makes the temporary structure most useful.
According to the semantic coding model, quantita-
tive attribute information (analog or discrete) is not
18
stored at all in semantic memory, but in most cases
is searched for in an inferential fashion when it is
needed. Some support for this contention comes from
the illustration by Walker (1975) of flexibility and
contextual effects in our application of the quantita-
tive attribute knowledge we possess. Banks suggests
that the search might include hunting for isolated facts,
possibly image construction, or the use of heuristic
such as the one previously mentioned in which the search
is for a third item which can detail the relation be-
tween the two items being judged. We assume that the
search process can be more precisely described for any
particular task or circumstance.
Applications and Further Qualification of the Models
There appear to be at least three general phenomena
found in the majority of comparative judgment and similar
tasks. The first of these, the symbolic distance effect,
has already been elaborated in the preceding discussion:
"The time needed to compare two symbols varies inversely
with the distance between their referents on the judged
dimension" (Moyer and Bayer, 1976). All of the models
considered so far can readily predict this effect.
Perceptual models assume that the representation
has the continuous characteristics of the real objects.
19
perhaps in terms of a second-order isomorphism, within
the perceptual class are two subgroups. Image-process-
ing models assume that the representation is a spatial
representation like an internalized perception. The
symbolic distance effect is the result of the same
(unidentified) perceptual mechanisms that produce the
parallel effect in judgements of actual objects. Inde-
pendent continuous models are derived from the assumption
that continuous or analog code information is used inde-
pendent of the reliance on an image-type representation.
Reference point models of this independent continuous
subgroup describe the comparison process as the computa-
tion of a discrepancy ratio of the distance from each
of the compared items to a common reference point on the
dimension. The farther apart two items fall on the di-
mension, the more different the ratio is from one and the
easier the decision— thus the symbolic distance effect.
The semantic coding model assumes that at least the
processing representation has the discrete characteris-
tics of natural language. The symbolic distance effect
is predicted by the availability principle as it is
applied to the search process required to generate dis-
criminable codes of the compared items: the closer the
two items are on the dimension, the more difficult it
will be to find information which places them in separate
categories
.
Serial-position effects have frequently been
reported for these tasks. The function of interest in
this case is the relationship between reaction time and
the position of a pair on the scale in question. Two
forms of serial position effect have been reported; a
symmetrical inverse U-shaped function is usually found
in experiments using finite stimulus sets (e.g.. Potts,
1972; Banks, 1977), but an asymmetrically bowed in-
creasing (in some cases monotonic) function is often
found for pre-experimentally defined orderings (e.g.,
Moyer and Bayer, 1976; McKinley, 1975)
.
All models need to rely on a temporary data
structure to predict a completely bowed inverse U-shaped
function. In experiments which use a relatively
arbitrary ordering on which the subjects are trained
within the experiment (e.g.. Potts, 1974b; Trabasso,
Riley and Wilson, 1975; Kosslyn, Murphy, Bemesderfer,
and Feinstein, 1977) the bowed serial position function
may be a function of differential associations of the
placed items with their positions on the scale. Riley
(Potts e_t al
. , 1978) has suggested such temporary order
ings may be constructed in an ends-inward fashion; this
would result in "easier" retrieval of items nearer the
ends, and accordingly graduated reaction times. For pre
21
experimental (untrained) finite orderings, the best
explanation of a completely bowed function involves
differential end-term processing. In the repeated test
situations that are almost requisite when using any
finite stimulus set, the end-anchors can each become
associated with a particular response and present a
"quick-exit" processing situation when they appear in
the stimulus pair. Several reports have discussed the
implications and explanatory limits of the end-term
strategies (cf. McKinley, 1975; Riley and Trabasso, 1974;
Holyoak and Walker, 1976). For the purpose of the pres-
ent consideration it is only important to note that data
usually show a decreased or absent distance effect for
end-term cases. End-term strategies have been blamed,
as well, for bowing in what appear to be otherwise
monotonic or nearly monotonic functions. The characteris-
tic of immediate interest is that such functions are
asymmetric; sometimes they are, in addition, monotonic.
Asymmetric serial functions have been found for
the special finite sets of digits, 0-9 (Moyer and
Landauer, 1973; Fairbank and Capehart, 1969) and of al-
phabetic letters (Lovelace and Snodgrass, 1971). In
these cases, the asymmetry is assumed to reflect the form
of the underlying scale. ' If the number scale is logarith-
mic (Banks and Hill, 1974), comparison of small digits
-son
Lons
22
will yield faster reaction times than will compari.
of large digits when compared. Asymmetric functic
have been interpreted by Moyer and Bayer (197 6) and
McKinley (1975) to reflect scanning processes, and by
Woocher, Glass, and Holyoak (1978) as the interactive
result of a directionally-biased scan and a symmetrical
effect of positional discriminability (i.e., differential
discriminability of item positions on an internal array,
of. Crowder, 1976; Trabasso and Riley, 1975).
Serial position effects, then, have primarily
been interpreted as evidence of an internalized linear
array, perhaps a scaffold as Bower (1971) suggested but
not necessarily purely ordinal; and frequently the serial
position functions have been interpreted as scan func-
tions as well.
The third effect is actually a special form of
the second. The semantic-congruity effect involves an
interaction between the form of the question or instruc-
tion and the level of the stimuli on the continuum being
judged. A comparison can be made more quickly if the
items compared are from the end of the scale consistent
with the form of the comparative term, i.e., it is easier
to decide which of two small items is smaller and which
of two large items is larger than, for instance, which
of two small items is larger. Sometimes this is a com-
plete "crossover" effect (the ease of the alternate
decisions completely reverse at opposite ends of the
scale). For other data and continua
, one form of the
question may always seem to have a certain advantage,
but the advantage may not be so pronounced at the opposite
end of the scale.
The congruity effect (as it will be referred to
in the remainder of this paper, although there are
congruity effects other than the semantic— size congruity
is one) is very difficult for some models to explain.
It was, in fact, the main premise on which Banks and his
colleagues developed the semantic coding model. Image-
processing models have the greatest problem predicting
any change in the pattern of reaction times with the
form of the question. For a finite set, it can be
assumed that the congruity effect is just another way
of presenting either of the serial position effects
described above, and that the explanation is essentially
the same. If the subject begins scanning at the end of
an internalized ordering or scaffold, the items nearest
that end will be reached most quickly. If the additional
assumption is made that the subject begins at the end
designated by the question, the interaction of the con-
gruity effect may be predicted; when asked "Which is
larger?," the subject begins at the large end of the
scale to look for the items and finds large items most
easily. There has been no reason to disbelieve this
account for finite sets; however, Banks and Flora (1977)
have recently demonstrated the congruity effect for
infinite sets as well. m an infinite set design, the
effect cannot be the result of processing on a scaffold
or other associative structure built up during repeated
testing of items. End-item associations are also ruled
out
.
Kosslyn and his colleagues C1977) have suggested
the concept of "recalibration" as an explanation for
congruity effects in imaginal comparison. The idea of
recalibration is that we set our perceptual mechanisms
for a certain range of percepts and that we must readjust
this range if it is inappropriate. If we compare the
largeness of images in terms of the amount of space
filled, we might set a criterion for accumulated "filled
space" which is higher for large-range images than for
small images. This is easiest to understand in terms of
a "frame" in which the image is constructed; we would
make a large frame when asked "how large?" and a small
one when asked "how small?." If the image turned out
to be a small one in a large frame, the sampling process
would not be adequately sensitive. We would be required
to recalibrate the frame and this process would use time.
lions
This is an expectancy effect in which the instruct:
define what is to be expected. Banks and Flora (1977)
have reported results which question the adequacy of
this explanation. They used a task in which instructions
were delayed until after the stimuli were presented
(in fact they tried several forms of the task) so
there could be no expectancy. The data demonstrated
convincingly that the semantic congruity effect was un-
changed. It is not clear how the "frame" explanation
could deal with this data.
The independent continuous models represented by
the reference point model fare far better. The expec-
tancy hypothesis would, of course, have applied to this
model as well; one simply chooses the reference point
designated by the comparative term in the question.
Alternatively, however, it is possible to simply select
that reference point which is nearest to the items being
judged. This alternative readily predicts the congruity
effect and it is not dependent upon expectancy (although
the point surely might be selected "ahead of time" if
the situation made is feasible)
.
The semantic coding model, of course, has a ready
explanation of the congruity effect. The effect is the
result of processing in the third stage, where the
generated codes are matched with the code for the instruc-
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tions. If the generated codes are LARGE and LARGE+
,
which would usually be the case if both items came
from the same generally large end of the scale, and the
instruction code was LARGE+ (pick the largest)
, then
the match to the instructions would be easy. if, how-
ever, the instruction code were SMALL+ (pick the small-
est) for the same set of stimulus codes, the matching
stage would have to transform the stimulus codes to match
the instructions (the transformation is arbitraily
assumed always to go in this stimulus-to-instruction
direction). Thus LARGE/LARGE+ would be transformed to
SMALL+/SMALL before the match could be effected and time
would be consumed. The closer the items are to the
named end of the scale, the more likely that they will
be coded in a "matchable" fashion.
To summarize, all three models can predict the
symbolic distance effect, and account for serial position
effects as described; however, the image-processing model
runs into very serious difficulty with the semantic-
congruity effect while the two alternate models predict
the effect rather simply.
There are several reasons for rejecting the image-
processing subclass besides this one (albeit rather sig-
nificant) problem. Several recent experiments provide
additional negative evidence. First, Holyoak (1977)
reported a recent set of experiments attempting to
elucidate the function of imagery in mental size com-
parison. He found that although subjects could utilize
images when instructed to do so, there was no evidence
that subjects needed to use imagery if not asked to do
so, even when comparing very similar items. Secondly,
a number of researchers have obtained symbolic distance
and congruity effects for "non-perceptual" dimensions.
Holyoak and Walker (1976) demonstrated the effects for
semantic adjective qualities such as good - fair dimen-
sions, Friedman (in press) reproduced the evaluative
dimension effect in both finite and infinite set para-
digms (ruling out ordinal temporary data-base explana-
tions which might be used to "back up" the imaginal
process)
,
and Kerst and Howard (1977) extended the
effect to rankings of animals, countries, and cars on
both concrete (perceptual) and abstract (non-perceptual)
dimensions. In light of this evidence compounded with
the semantic-congruity difficulties, we will discontinue
consideration of image-processing models for the time
being. It is only fair to add that both Kosslyn, Murphy,
Bemesderfer, and Feinstein (1977) and Paivio (1978) have
proposed dual-process models (imagery and verbal codes)
which answer most of the above concerns. However, in
28
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-ce
the interest of parsimony, it seems unwise to propos(
dual processes if a single process model will suffi.
to explain the data.
It is important to point out that discarding the
notion of imagery as necessary for comparative judgement
by no means indicates a belief that it does not occur
at all. The many phenomena reported by Shepard and his
colleagues (e.g., Shepard and Feng, 1972; Shepard and
Chipman, 1970) are alone sufficient to defend the concept
of the image as a viable construct. A reasonable sug-
gestion has been offered by Holyoak (1977) : perhaps in
the comparison task the formation of images is a
tangential and effortless process which proceeds in
parallel with semantic thought, but which is neither used
nor needed. Since the image is a "surface" representa-
tion and easily described as well, subjects report its
presence even when not manipulating it directly. In
any case, until there appear to be compelling reasons to
reconsider, image-processing models of comparative judge-
ment will not be dealt with further.
The two models holding the most promise are the
reference point model (an independent continuous model)
and the semantic coding model (a linguistic code model)
.
The data of the experiment to be reported aid in assess-
ing these models for their generality and usefulness.
The factor which most obviously differentiates
the models presently considered in this report is the
ordinal/interval (discrete/analog) form of information
in the representation used for comparative judgements
which subsequently produce the symbolic distance effect.
The experiment was designed to assess the relative
contributions of analog and ordinal information to these
decisions. This was and still is an important distinc-
tion between the proposed processes.
In order to evaluate the contributions of these
variables in a direct way, stimuli were selected in
which the ordinal and semantic relationships between
items could be manipulated independently. Lists which
differed in the ordinal distance or real-world (analog)
distance between similar items were constructed. For
instance, in the lists dog^-bear^-elephant^ and dog2-
elephant2-whale2 / semantic distance between dog and
elephant is equivalent, but the ordinal distance is great-
er in the first list, as they are separated by another
item on the list. Dog^^-bear^^ and dog2-elephant2 ^ on the
other hand present equal ordinal distances, but the analog
(real-world) difference is greater for dog2-elephant2
•
Finally, some pairs had equivalent distance, but different
ordinal (serial) position in the list. For example, in
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mouse3-dog3-bear3 and dog^-bear^-elephant^
, dog-bear
differs only in serial position—having equivalent
ordinal and analog distances. Thus, for any particular
pair, judgement times from different lists could be
compared to evaluate effects of ordinal and analog
distance and ordinal position separately.
Additionally, looking back over the reports
produced since the experiment was conducted and with
the data to be presented in hand, we could see that
there were more specific implications of the presently
interesting model classes which could be examined.
Some assumptions can be made which, though not yet
delineated formally, follow logically from the models as
presented. It will be argued that the semantic coding
model predicts that strong ordinal effects will appear
in comparative judgement mean RT for some tasks even if
information is drawn from a long-term data base. To
wit: the semantic coding model proposes that a code is
generated for each item as it is considered in a com-
parison. For the sake of clear discussion, we will assume
that only a limited number of codes (e.g., large, large+,
small, small+) are used for this task. (To assume a
greater number of codes would not substantially alter
the arguments.) Secondly, we will assume that once a
particular code is generated for an item, that same code
is more likely to be regenerated than other codes for
that item. This may be conceived in terms of attach-
ing a "label" or activating a particular connection or
whatever. The point of importance is that the probabil-
ity of regenerating the code previously selected for an
item is increased each time it is selected for that
item. Finally, we assume that there is residual
activation of information previously accessed. After
repeated testing, given these assumptions, the probability
with which a particular discrete code is likely to be
generated for an item will directly reflect the ordinal
relationship of that item to the other items in the
list. Items nearer the ends of the lists, for example,
will be more likely to "produce" Large+ or Small+ codes.
In this way, ordinal information might be the most
easily accessible discrete information in long-term
memory as well as in a temporary data base scaffold
(if one is constructed) . This does not imply that a
"long-term memory linear array" is constructed, but only
that discrete information retrieved from long-term memory
will most likely be similar to that derived from a
temporary linear memory array.
According to the reference-point model, no particu-
lar predictions are made concerning repeated-testing
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effects. It is possible, of course, that sampled
analog information would be "more excited" than other
possible samples, but it does not seem that these
samples could reflect the ordinal list relationships
in any direct way as is the case with discrete codes.
To summarize this argument, the semantic coding
model, as interpreted, predicts that in any repeated-
test paradigm, ordinal list relationships will be
reflected in the symbolic distance effect whenever dis-
crete information is accessed for comparative judgement.
This is true even if long-term memory is used for that
judgement.
The present experiment was originally designed to
assess the relative contribution of semantic and ordinal
distance effects. It is now apparent that the semantic
coding model predicts that ordinal effects must be pres-
ent in a repeated-set paradigm. An absence of semantic
distance effects creates difficulties for both models.
Present Experiment
The experiment used four seven-term size-order ings
chosen from a single list of twelve names of familiar
objects. Thus no experimental training was required in
using the orderings in a sentence-verification paradigm,
parallel to that of McKinley (1975) , in which reaction
times and errors were recorded. The four lists were
constructed such that ordinal separation and semantic
distance could be examined orthogonally. a means of
evaluating the serial position effect was also included.
Each of the items was tested repeatedly over a two-day
period.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
A total of thirty-two subjects served in the
experiment. They were undergraduates who participated
for experimental credit toward course grades or to
complete a course requirement. Each subject partici-
pated in one fifty-minute session on each of three
consecutive days. Only the first two days' data are
of immediate interest, since the third day constituted
a separate experiment.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a video monitor con-
trolled by a PDP-8E computer. Reaction times were
obtained and recorded under program control using a
response console with two trigger-switches and a central
button which could be illuminated. The trigger-switches
were labelled "True" and "False" appropriately.
Materials
A twelve-item list, the ten-item "objects" list
used in McKinley's (1975) previous study with two new
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items added, was used to construct four separate seven-
item lists with common elements. The two additional
items were chosen from a list generated by six subjects
who were asked to nam.e all the items they could think
of which were household objects larger than a briefcase
and smaller than a bicycle. The names of all the items
were printed on cards, one to a card, including
McKinley's original ten items. The same subjects were
then asked to order all the cards according to the
size"^ of the items named and the two most consistently
placed new items were selected and added to the list.
The twelve-item list is indicated in Table 1, along with
the four seven-item lists constructed from it.
Four seven-item test lists were chosen such that
two distance measures, semantic distance and ordinal
separation, could be examined independently. In general,
single ordinal steps in List A represented smaller
semantic distances than did ordinal steps in Lists B,
C, or D. Since the items were the same for all lists,
semantic distance was equated while ordinal separation
and serial position were varied. In addition, checks
for the confounding effect of overall serial position
of a pair were included.
The major critical items for the analysis v/ere those
from positions 4, 6, and 8 in the original twelve-item
base list. Note that List A constituted a complete series
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1. Pin
2. Toothpick
3. Razorblade
4. Matchbook
5 . Teaspoon
6. Lightbulb
7. Brick
8
.
9. Briefcase
10. Typewriter (new item)
11. Television (new item)
12. Bicycle
Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
A 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
B 1 2 4 6* 8 10 11
C 2 4# 6 8 10 11 12
D 1 3 5 7 9 11 12
* Insert item 7 on Day 3
# Insert item 5 on Day 3
Numbers refer to position of items
in the original twelve-item list.
Table 1: Structure of the twelve-item list and the four
test lists constructed from it. (McKinley's,
1975, Objects list plus two new items.)
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of items 3 through 9 of the base list. Thus items 4 and
6 were two ordinal steps apart, as were 6 and 8 . m
List B, these items were adjacent. In List C, these
items were again adjacent, but the serial position of
the items was altered such that pairs including items
4, 6, 8, and 10 appeared at earlier positions in the
serial order. Furthermore, pairs in List C which included
item 4 had the same initial serial position as correspond-
ing pairs in List A. List D was a control list, providing
adjacent-pair (single-step) situations for pairs 3-5,
5-7, and 7-9. Note that this was a second situation
(comparable to List B, but with different semantic
items) in which a single ordinal step in List A repre-
sented less semantic distance than the equivalent step
in the alternate list.
The seven-term orderings allowed 21 unique pairings
of items for each list. The test statements were
constructed from these in the form "A is smaller than B" .
The comparative "smaller" was always used. There was
no interest in checking for a congruency effect as it
had already been demonstrated for the objects list in
the similar task used by McKinley (1975) . The term
"smaller" was selected for use because it produced more
stable data in that study than the question using
"larger . "
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The pre-test materials were four sets of seven
cards each, one set for each list, with the name of a
different item from the list printed on each card next
to a line drawing of the object. Each subject saw only
one of the sets (lists)
.
Procedure
The subjects were run individually in three sessions,
each consisting of a practice block of trials and eight
data-collection blocks.
For the pre-test, each subject was given a set of
cards and asked to put them in order according to size
of the items indicated. S/he was allowed to do this in
any manner (laying them out, putting them in a stack,
etc.) or direction (largest to smallest or vice versa).
The order and manner were recorded. If more than three
items of the subject's ordering conflicted with the
chosen ordering, the subject was dismissed from the
experiment with appropriate credit. If three or fewer
items conflicted, the experimenter pointed out the
disagreement (s) and asked the subject if s/he agreed
that the ordering being used for the experiment was a
reasonable one. If the subject agreed, the cards were
randomized and the subject was asked to order them again.
If agreement was not reached on this trial, the subject
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was dismissed with appropriate credit. if agreement
was reached, the cards were reshuffled and the subject
was asked to reproduce the order to a criterion of
two consecutive correct orderings. No subject was run
more than three pre-test trials, and no subject was
used who did not agree that the ordering was a rational
or natural one for him or her. In addition, any subject
whose error rate rose above 5% (17 errors on either Day 1
or Day 2) on the data-collection trials was dismissed
from the experiment and given appropriate credit. Only
two subjects exceeded the error limit and had to be
dismissed. The subjects dismissed were from the C and
D list groups and each made IS total errors.
There was a practice block of 10 statements ran-
domly selected from the possible set at the beginning
of each day's testing. In addition, data from the first
two trials of each data-block were discarded and the
test statements replaced in the pool.
Each block of trials included one presentation of
each of the twenty-one pairs at each truth value. The
forty-two resulting test sentences were randomized within
a trial block. For each trial, a statement appeared on
the screen and remained there until the subject responded
"true" or "false" by pulling the corresponding trigger.
Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly as possible
40
without making errors. At the end of each block, a
central button lit up and the subject's mean RT and
error rate appeared on the screen to assist him/her in
monitoring his/her performance. The subject pressed
the lighted central button to continue to the next
block.
Eight subjects were tested with each list; half
used their dominant hand for the "True" response and
half used their non-dominant hand. List (A-D)
, and
Hand (Dominant or Non-dominant for True)
, formed eight
independent groups for between-subject analysis. Day
(1 or 2)
,
Truth Value (True or False) and Pair (1-21)
were within-subject factors.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Mean correct reaction times were calculated over
the eight data collection blocks for each of the forty-
two pairs for each subject for each of the first two
days. The number of correct responses was calculated
similarly. a five-factor analysis of variance was
performed on each of these measures with List, Hand,
Subject within List-Hand, Day, Truth Value and Pair as
factors. As was expected, given previous data, there
was no effect of the dominant or non-dominant hand being
used for the "True" response, so it was possible to
collapse the analysis across the Hand factor to gain
power. Anova results reported will be from the collapsed
analysis. The average error rate was very low, 3.25%.
All error analyses and results paralleled those for re-
action time, and the conditions that were slower also had
more errors, thus belying a speed/accuracy trade-off.
The specific error analyses will not be reported, but
error data noted when it does not parallel RT
.
Analysis of Variance Results
Main interest was in the List and Day main effects
and in the List by Pair interaction. Appendix A
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summarizes the results of the full analysis. The
analysis of variance provided a general look at overall
list, response bias, and practice effects. Since the
ordering of the individual pairs for such an analysis
was logical but necessarily arbitrary, the expected main
effect of pair was examined more closely by inspecting
qualitative patterns in the data and through specific
planned contrasts of particular pairs.
Table 2 shows the average reaction times and per-
centage errors for each list. The main effect of List
was significant (F (3,28) = 3.92, p < .05). Since the
lists were the same length, list differences should be
attributable to item differences and differences in
semantic distance between items. Of course, when the
average semantic distance between items in a list in-
creases, its range increases. Range differences were
very slight in this experiment; List A's range was the
only one noticeably smaller. Previous studies (McKinley,
197 5) have indicated that range was probably a weak factor
at best.
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List A B
Mean 1558.00 1126.78 1533.73 1255.65
Percent 2.73 2.93 3.08 2.88Errors ^ oo
Table 2: Average reaction times and percentage errors by
list.
Lists B and C varied in only one item, so that the
apparent difference between them is difficult to assign.
Since the main effect of List, even with items of totally
different classes (animals, balls, fruits, and objects)
was not very strong in McKinley's (1975) study, item
differences would not be expected to account for much
variance. Moreover, List D, with an almost entirely
different set of items, had an average reaction time
very close to that for List B. It seems reasonable to
suppose, then, that the List C average RT reflects a
maverick variable to be explicated through qualitative
analysis
.
The difference between the List A reaction time
and those for Lists B and D may have been produced by a
general slowing of the RT's for List A. This would be
expected if the Symbolic Distance Effect was largely
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controlled by semantic distance. Overall semantic dista
(range) could have been a factor, but more compelling
is the fact that the average semantic distance between
pairs was less for List A than for any of the other three
lists, though ordinal distances were obviously the same.
The general slowing of reaction times for List A would
support the hypothesis of strong semantic components in
the Symbolic Distance Effect. Note that increasing the
absolute size differences (semantic differences)
decreases RT but does not significantly change errors;
this has been demonstrated by Potts (1974a) and by Moyer
and Bayer (1976). It is as if subjects were changing
criterion to keep error rate constant and thereby
lowering RT. This is a between list speed-accuracy
tradeoff.
Similarly, the significant List by Pair Interaction
(F (60,560) = 2.47, p < .05) indicated a strong semantic
component, since pairs in the analysis were defined by
ordinal locations. If pairs varied across lists, it
had to be due to the different semantic components of
the pairs.
The significant Day main effect (F (1,28) = 121.3,
p < .05) evidenced the fact that subjects were much
faster (approximately 500 msec.) on the second day. Day
did not interact in an important way with anything except
nee
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Truth Value. This was due to people learning about
the large end-anchor as discussed below.
Qualitative Patterns
Qualitative analyses generally showed that the
patterns of data normally referred to in discussions of
the Symbolic Distance Effect, serial position effects,
and end-anchor effects were replicated for this study.
Figure 2 illustrates the distance effect in the
data averaged over days. Mean reaction time was inversely
related to the distance (number of ordinal steps) between
terms in a pair, decreasing as the number of ordinal
steps between terms increased. The slopes for all lists
are similar, with the intercepts for Lists A and C
reflecting the aforementioned overall increases in RT.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 illustrate serial position
curves very similar to the asymmetrically bowed curves
frequently found in comparative judgement tasks. The
figures demonstrate the effects for pairs of stepsize 1
(adjacent pairs), 2, and 3 respectively within each of
the lists. Even with end-anchor pairs eliminated, 10
out of the 12 best-fitting lines had slopes greater than
zero. This proportion of positive slopes was significant
by a simple sign test (Z = 2.07, p < .02).
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Figures 6 and 7 graphically demonstrate end-anchor
effects. Note that these curves are plotted in the sa.e
manner as the distance effect curves of Figure 2 except
that only anchor pairs are included. Distance between
the anchor item and the other member of the pair
increases along the abscissa. Most of these end- term
functions show a decreased or absent effect of distance,
being more flattened than the comparable curves of
Figure 2 and indicating differential processing of
pairs containing end terms. The effect of an end-anchor
strategy was most evident in both the "true" and
"false" curves of Figure 6 for the small anchor. This
might be expected, since the comparative was always
"smaller" (vide Woocher, Glass and Holyoak, 1978).
For "true" pairs, those in which the small anchor
occurred on the left (i.e., "A (anchor) is smaller than
X"), the curves are especially flattened, indicating a
universally quick acceptance. Moving to Figure 7, we
see that for "false" pairs, in which the large anchor
appeared on the left and presented a quick-reject
opportunity, the curves are again nearly flat. List D
presents the most ambiguous support for a large-anchor
effect.
The end-anchor plots also revealed the source of
the problematic difference in the average reaction time
51
2.0 00
u /Sao
3,7 3 8
Sea
<- -2 ^ ~ i^i / <S / 7
Ord<na.l PoSi t'""S
'''^ <^ 4 /, 7
1.000
too
List C
ZOQQ
z,8
/ZOO
/OO 0
$00
',2. ',i 1,6 . '.7
III-
/ i / ^ / y i,s- 1,6 1,7
Figure 6 . Mean reaction times for anchor pairs
in which the small (position 1) anchor occurred.
52
1000
1900
ItOO
ItOO
11.0 0
List A
True.
%8
16
%7
&00
^ooo
/BOO
$00
2 ^ Z3
List 8
7 / ?* Z-^ Z'* 73 71
Or<i'ft<l/ Poi.r-ians
iiOo
/ 900
/iOa
/COO
Sao
List C
10 oa
o /*oo
'i.00
/ooo
QOO
Li it H
76 7,S 7f 7J 7i
Oriiina/ Pos,tiois
76 7,r 11 13 71
Figure 7. Mean reaction time for anchor pairs on
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for List C, compared to the other lists. Referring again
to Figure 6, note that the response time for small-
anchor true sentences is not the same across lists.
This is remarkable, since it supposedly reflects a
standard quick-exit response (cf. Potts, 1972, 1973;
Trabasso and Riley, 1975; McKinley, 1975; Moyer and
Bayer, 1976). it is logical to assume that the differ-
ences between these flat-response times reflect overall
response-time imbalances between the subject groups
used for each list. The slowing of List C is attributable
to uninteresting subject differences.
Table 3 presents the average reaction times for
the four lists and the differences between those RTs
.
The second row of figures indicates the average small
anchor response times and the differences between those
response times. The third row shows the average list
RT differences which remain unaccounted for by the
differences in quick-response anchor times. This last
row indicates that approximately 150 to 200 msec, of
the List A RT difference remains unaccounted for by the
above analysis, adding credence to the interpretation
of that difference as attributable to the closer
semantic spacing of that list. Finally, as expected,
all subjects in this task reported, as in previous
tasks, that they believed they had used imagery. Some
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subjects reported "overlaying" the images and some
reported creating adjacent images. One subject reported
not requiring imagery on the second day, but could
not describe how he did perform the task.
Contrasts
The cardinal concern of this study was the
relative impact of semantic versus ordinal attributes
on judgement time. To examine these influences of
semantic distance, ordinal position, and step size
(ordinal distance) more systematically, three major
contrasts were performed using only those pairs in
which these factors varied orthogonally. Two forms
of score standardization were employed in order to
confirm the accuracy of the results. The contrasts
were performed separately for true and false sentences,
making a total of six contrasts for each type of
standardization; accordingly, the rejection level was
set at = .01 for each contrast, thus holding the
below .10 as suggested by Scheffe (cit. Myers, 1972,
pp. 360-364). Table 4 lists the pairs and scores used
in the contrasts.
First all scores were adjusted individually for
each subject by his or her estimated quick-response
time. Each subject's average small-anchor true response
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time (the average of the six pairings (1,2 through 1,7)
in which the small anchor appeared on the left) was
subtracted from each of his or her reaction time scores
for "True" sentences. The average large-anchor false
reaction time (the average of the six pairings (7,6
through 7,1) in which the large anchor appeared on the
left) was likewise subtracted from the reaction times
for "False" sentences. This was done separately for
each day's scores, and the results combined.
Semantic distance demonstrated a reliable effect
with the predicted difference tested against zero for
both true and false response times (t (1,28) = 2.95,
true pairs; t (1,28) = 3.12, false pairs). This means
that with ordinal position and stepsize held constant,
the semantic distance represented within a pair signifi-
cantly affected reaction time. This is evident in the
individual pairs of "anchor adjusted" scores listed in
Table 4 for the semantic distance contrast. (Only "True"
scores are indicated in the table, false scores were
essentially similar.) For instance, list positions 2
and 3 are matchbook-teaspoon and matchbook-lightbulb in
Lists A and C respectively. The adjusted scores are
813 and 471 msec. : with all ordinal variables held
constant the analog differences in size were reflected
in the reaction times. This relationship holds for
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each of the nine simple comparisons used; the pair with
greater semantic distance invariably has a shorter RT
and the magnitude differences are relatively consistent.
The ordinal position evaluation showed no signifi-
cant effects. With semantic distance and stepsize held
constant, serial position in the list had no effect.
Again, examining individual paired sets supports the
overall contrasts: only three of five differences
are in the predicted direction and these are small.
Finally, the stepsize contrasts showed an ambi-
guous effect in which the contrast for false sentences
was not significant, but for true sentences there was
a negative effect of stepsize (t (1,28) =
-3.93).
This would indicate that items closer together in the
list were actually easier to discriminate than those
with greater ordinal separation. Besides being totally
contrary to intuition for this sort of a task, this
result was the reverse of all previously-reported
findings (Potts, et al
. ,
1978).
If we recall that the List A average reaction time
was approximately 150 to 200 msec, slower than accounted
for by the quick-response estimates, it becomes apparent
from Table 3 that pairs from List A could bias a
contrast by virtue of the reaction-time "advantage."
By the necessary structure of the contrasts, the List A
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"advantage" may have biased the semantic distance
contrast toward significance, and the stepsize contrast
away from significance. it would have had no effect on
the ordinal position evaluation, as no pairs from List A
are included in that contrast. m order to verify the
obtained results, a second set of contrasts was performed
using scores adjusted for each subject's individual mean
reaction time. This had not been chosen as the initial
adjustment measure because it effectively obliterates
list differences; however, it provides the most conser-
vative assessment of semantic distance and stepsize
effects
.
There is a crossover in the appropriateness of
the two forms of score standardization, as is indicated
in the column headings for Table 4. The anchor adjust-
ment method was "too conservative" for the stepsize
evaluation, biasing the contrast against significance.
For the semantic distance evaluation, however, adjusting
for subject means (including the "extra" List A RT) is
the more conservative measure. The means adjustment
(removing list effects) could artificially remove a real
reaction time difference for the semantically closer
items of List A.
Results of the "means-adjusted" contrasts were as
before, except that the "negative effect of stepsize"
disappeared-it was obviously a spurious result.
Examining the individual pairings in Table 4 shows that
3 of the 4 comparisons were in the predicted direction,
but the greatest magnitude in these differences is only
85 msec. Effects in the semantic evaluation were often
double that magnitude. Semantic distance remained
significant (t (1,28) = 3.23, true pairs; t (1,28) = 2.9;
false pairs) even in this conservative test, and no
effect of stepsize or ordinal position was statistically
evident.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Ordinal properties of items in naturally
ordered lists have no effect on the difficulty of
performing memorial comparisons of those items. When
semantic distance, ordinal separation and serial posi-
tion were totally unconfounded in the comparative
judgement of object sizes, only semantic distance
was found to have a significant effect on reaction
time. This was found in a repeated test paradigm
using a finite set of stimulus items. It will be argued
below that these results firmly establish the necessity
for a mode of memorial comparison in which analog re-
lationships are not only stored in memory, but reflected
in the information we use to make comparative decisions.
Although the present results do not rule out the
use of a linear array for decision-making in some com-
parative tasks, they do suggest that data patterns
previously accepted as evidence for ordinal effects
should be examined in more detail. Data from this ex-
periment, plotted in the standard fashion, showed patterns
which have commonly been interpreted as evidence of serial
position and ordinal separation factors systematically
affecting reaction times. Many researchers (Meyer and
Bayer, 1976; McKinley, 1975; Banks, 1977; Woocher
, Glass,
and Holyoak, 1978) have interpreted serial position
functions, in particular, as evidence of the use of an
internalized linear array. in some cases, they have also
been the basis for the proposal of a scanning process.
While linear arrays almost surely form the data base for
some memorial comparison tasks, their construction and
use may not be as common as has been claimed.
In the present task, subjects were exposed to the
same seven stimulus items repeatedly over the course
of two days. Apart from the pretest ordering and the
practice trials at the beginning of the day and before
each block, a subject made a comparative decision about
any one item against the others in the list 96 times per
day! If subjects did not form and use a linear
"scaffold" in this situation, and they did not, we cer-
tainly must be cautious in proposing that such scaffolds
are likely to be used in other circumstances. One
probable exception is the case of experimentally taught
orderings, especially if the orderings are arbitrary and
relatively meaningless outside the experimental context.
In such a case, there seem to be few reasonable ways for
a subject to efficiently encode and memorize the trained
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relationships. Even in such cases as these, it appears
to be imperative to "double check" qualitative analyses
with quantitative evaluations (e.g., Woocher
, Glass,
and Holyoak, 1978). At the very least, we must reexamine
the relationship between processes of retrieval and com-
parison in tasks using orderings learned within the ex-
periment and those using orderings based on pre-experi-
mental knowledge; the correspondence may be more tenuous
than we had presumed.
The present results also suggest some specifica-
tions and/or modifications of the long-term data struc-
tures and related processes for the reference point and
semantic coding models.
The lack of evidence for an effect of serial posi-
tion of items in the list has direct implications for
the reference point models as described by Jamieson and
Petrusic (1975) and Holyoak (1978). It might be assumed
that the end-anchors for the lists would also serve as
the natural reference points for computing discrepancy
ratios; had this been in fact true, however, it would
have produced a negative effect of serial position for
the selected pairs in which it was possible to evaluate
the effect independently. The identical items in Lists
B and C would have been evaluated against a smaller end-
term in List B than in List C, giving the latter com-
parison the reaction time advantage. This is exactly
the reverse of the prediction made in terms of ordinal
position. Since there was no effect, in either direc-
tion, of serial position for these pairs, the end term
could not have served as the reference point. However,
if a consistent reference point outside the list were
selected, identical pairs in the two lists would have
produced identical discrepancy ratios, regardless of the
ordinal position of the pairs. The most interesting
aspect of this interpretation derives from the fact
that list was a between-subject variable; the implication
is that different subjects selected similar reference
points. There is reason to believe that certain "typical"
representations in memory may serve as ideal anchor points.
Rosch and her colleagues (Rosch, 1975a, 1975b; Rosch,
Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem, 1976) have
presented the hypothesis that natural categories have
prototypical examplars which appear with consistency
across subjects, even cultures. We could additionally
suggest that very large categories (such as "large
things") may have prototypical exemplars of the extremes
as well as of the central tendencies (or most overlapping
attributes, or whatever). Dimensions themselves might
act as categories and demonstrate the characteristics.
The concept of an "ideal" reference point also coincides
with the findings of Audley and Wallis (1964). They
found a congruity effect which was nearly symmetrical
when the background illumination was moderate; but when
the background was very light or very dark, the general
advantage switched to "darker" or "lighter" judgements.
The light background may have made the ideal light
reference point less efficient and vice versa. The con-
cept of ideal reference representations is intriguing
enough to merit further investigation.
But we suggested modification and specification
of both model classes. The present study allows con-
sideration of the semantic coding model on several
points. First, as previously mentioned, decisions made
in this task apparently were not mediated by a temporary
data base structure. Data structure searches which would
have produced serial position effects were definitely
not evident in this task. It is possible, of course,
that a scaffold was used just to "hold" information in
active memory in order to provide easy access, but that
no characteristics of this storage were used to compute
a decision. If analog quantities were directly accessed
from a scaffold, and then compared, this would be tanta-
mount to a perceptual comparison, e.g., Jamieson
and Petrusic's (1975) model (given the necessary additions
to account for congruity) . It is hard to see how a code
could be generated from a scaffold without referring
to at least the ordinal relationships which are repre-
sented in it. But if ordinal relationships were examined,
at least a stepsize effect as found in transitive in-
ference studies would be predicted. One was not found,
and it will be argued below that subjects were not en-
gaging in transitive inference. It appears safe to
suppose that more permanent semantic memory was accessed
to perform this task.
The second specification of the semantic coding
model concerns the availability principle and the search
mechanism which generates appropriate categorial codes
for the stimuli. Banks (1977) described one likely
heuristic as a search for a third item which can describe
the relationship between the other two through transi-
tive inference (Riley, 1976). For example, if the
comparative decision were between A and C, we would
search memory to find the relationships A > B and B > C,
then by inference decide that A > C. The more ordinal
steps (items) between the items compared, the greater
the number of items which could be used to make a
transitive inference; therefore, the transitive inference
search in the present task would predict an effect of
stepsize (increased step => decreased RT) , which was
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not found. A transitive inference should have been
easy to perforin: the "item between" was provided
within the context of the task itself. Even if subjects
were not actively forming and using listings, priming
or availability ("activation" in memory) of the item
is represented as a magnitude rather than by ordinal
indicators. We might then compare these magnitude
estimates in terms of the third item, with a bit of
reflection, it becomes clear that this heuristic being
proposed for the semantic coding model bears a striking
resemblance to the reference point model! If we can
accept the proposition that this distance-to-a-third-
item heuristic is viable as a semantic coding explana-
tion of performance in the comparative judgement task,
at least three questions remain: 1) Can we discriminate
this heuristic and the reference point model? 2) Why
might we use reference points? 3) Are they feasible in
terms of any more global concepts of memory?
As Holyoak (1978) has noted, the distance ratio
measure is sensitive both to the sum of the distances
(actually, to each of the separate distances, which is
assumed to be equivalent) and to the difference between
them. So it is very difficult to discover whether
"distance" relative to the reference point affects the
generation or comparison stages or both, at least for
the reference point model. According to that model
(as clarified by Holyoak, 1978), calculation of the
distances to the reference point occurs in the genera-
tion stage, and the ratio is "set up" and estimated
in the comparison stage. Remember, however, that we have
assumed a continuous comparison process on these
analog values. The most clearly examined possibility
for this process is the stochastic sampling procedure
proposed by Buckley and Gillman (1974); a counter is
incremented or decremented after each sampling estimate
of the ratio is derived. If the counter does not pass
a criterion value, another sample is taken. The process
could require many repeated cycles through the generate/
compare process, and thus it is unlikely that we could
experimentally separate the two processes. Were we able
to separate the processes, we might try to discover
whether the comparison stage alone reflected analog
values of the stimuli. Banks (1977) predicts that all
analog effects occur prior to this code-comparison
component of the semantic coding model.
The other opportunity for differentiating the
models seems to lie in their different account of the
congruity effect. The semantic coding model predicts the
congruity effect by means of a conflict between the
linguistic comparison codes for the stimuli and that
for the instructions. The reference point model
attributes the effect to subjective differences in the
actual comparison of magnitudes as computed from one or
the other "polar" reference points. A means may be
developed in the future for distinguishing between these.
One possible basis for the use of reference points
has already been discussed. Our concepts may be or-
ganized such that each attribute or category has a
"best examplar" and it may be especially easy to retrieve
these from memory to use for any number of purposes
including as reference points for estimating continuous
attributes. Secondly, it would in many ways seem effi-
cient in terms of the long-term memory load to avoid
storing a whole range of possible attribute values with
each representative that we have in memory. Walker
(1975) has already produced evidence that discrete
attribute value information on at least physical proper-
ties is not stored (or not the only thing stored)
.
Finally, some aspect of the comparative judgement task
itself might predispose subjects to thinking in terms of
extreme or polar examples. This could be easily checked
by searching for evidence of reference points in other
tasks where the questions and stimulus variables are more
diverse. Rosch, for example (Rosch, Simpson, and
Miller, 1976), has reported some similar effects in the
acquisition of prototypical exemplars.
The concepts embodied in reference point inter-
pretations are quite compatible with several global
concepts of memory. Reference point concepts of
magnitude and dimensional knowledge are essentially
context-dependent in that the context may determine
the selection of the reference point or even the form
of the magnitude information retrieved (Holyoak, 1978).
Holographic models of memory (Cavanagh, 1972, 1976)
assume that exciting the memory representation in a
particular manner may obtain very different results from
exciting it in another. Some memory representations may
be responsive to only a few or one form of excitation,
and the information retrievable would be correspondingly
limited. John (1967) has formalized this type of a
memory model in neural terms. Another possibility is
that memories may be stored in a primarily episodic
(Tulving, 1972; Watkins and Tulving, 1976) form; this
would be consistent with many notions of neural activa-
tion and retention (Hebb, 1949) . If there are certain
commonalities among the different episodes, a common
excitation pattern might activate a set of dimensions
from several episodes or a set of activity patterns of
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any type which have occurred in a common context, a
pattern which is easily activated in many contexts or
which provides the context for many other patterns might
be equivalent to a reference point. John (1967)
describes the neural record, or memory, as a transient
pattern. in order for this transient pattern to be
interpreted, it must occur over a specific under layment
of excitation. If the referent (context) is not acti-
vated, the information is still stored, but is not
"available" for processing. Perhaps this is the parallel
to the means by which the use of reference points allows
us to retain inconceivable quantities of information
and yet have only particular portions of that knowledge
available to us at any particular point in time and
usually only relative to a certain context. The informa-
tion goes in in a "garbage pail" fashion (Landauer, 1975)
and is retrieved by virtue of its commonalities with
other episodes. The abstractive nature of memory would
be an almost incidental result of such a system.
However we represent individual instances in
memory, we are able to compare them on any single dimen-
sion as abstract wholistic concepts. It is not necessary
that we inspect internalized versions of perceptual ex-
perience itself. But we do have the continuous, analog
73
information available from perceptual (and perhaps
conceptual) experience included in the memory representa-
tion and we do utilize analog relationships in perform-
ing memorial comparison.
FOOTNOTES
In this paper, dimension and attribute will be
used interchangeably. However, in general
^^"^^"^^^^ ^ill ^^fe^ to the continuum along which
an attribute may vary, and attribute will be used
when referring to a particular value on a dimension.
These values may be numerical (2 tons) or ordinal
(large +)
.
We will not consider dimensions
with nominal values (male/female) in this paper.
^^^^Q? here is used in the sense of "not digital."
Especially, not numerical or binary, but including
anything of continuous or non-discrete character.
This might encompass graphic forms, but is not
limited to them. Kosslyn (1975) has suggested
undifferentiated as a useful designation; there are
an infinite number of points on an undifferentiated
dimension, and each of them has meaning.
This second criterion must be applied with dis-
cretion. It is recognized that believableness can
be affected by many irrelevant factors including
consistency with one's political views (cf. Chomsky,
1959)
,
taking a flattering or unflattering view of
mankind (cf. Bateson ^q79^ -,v,^odc , iy 2)
,
and consistency with
common folklore (cf. Rosen, 1968). Even the
apparently straightforward requirement of parsimony
has been contested (e.g., Minsky, 1975; Wicklegren,
1976) as far too restrictive for models of such
complex behaviors as human thought. Nonetheless,
selecting and pursuing only the more natural and
elegant of the myriad of available theories
facilitates empirical evaluation, communication,
and discussion and thus more directly benefits
creative and productive scientific effort.
To take this position, we must believe that true
anomalies will consistently recur and that any
essential details ignored in selecting unadorned
models will therefore eventually undermine the
plausibility of those models.
Second-order isomorphism is a concept proposed by
Shepard and Chipman (1970); while there may or may
not be direct structural resemblance between an
individual representation in memory and the actual
object, they propose an isomorphism between the
relations among external objects and the relations
among their corresponding internal representations.
In other words, "whatever neurophysiological events
are taking place while one is merely irna^inina the
external process in question-these events have
much in common with the internal events that occur
When one is actually perceiving the external process
itself" (Shepard and Feng, 1972)
.
Image-processing models have been referred to as
analog models (especially by Kosslyn and his
colleagues, e.g., Kosslyn et al
. , 1977). The term
used by Banks (1977) has been selected for use in
this paper in order to clarify the fact that there
are several analog models which do not require
reference to an internal representation which is
an "analog" to perception, but only assume the use
of a continuous representation of some kind. Pri-
marily, the limited sense of analog only requires
that interval or ratio scale properties of the
perceptual continuum be preserved, while Kosslyn 's
interpretation requires that we be able to rerepresent
the perception in memory.
Time to make a judgement is assumed to depend
specifically on the difference between the ratio
computed and a set criterion. The criterion is as-
sumed to be one in the case of unbiased decisions
(vide Jamieson and Petrusic, 1975) .
Size may not be a unitary dimension for real
Objects, but might refer to length, wrdth, thickness,
volume, or less obvious qualities. Nonetheless,
in multidimensional scalings (e.g., Henley, 1969)
of animals, objects, and even countries or states,
a dimension which is most readily interpreted as
"size" frequently emerges. This appears to be
reflected in natural language, as we can frequently
be heard to make remarks such as, "Oh, his house
is bigger than ours" when certainly we are speaking
not of the length, height, or even volume of the
house, but rather of general impressions on a "large-
ness" scale. Subjects evidenced no distress when
requested to "order these objects by size" (in the
present experiment as well as that of McKinley, 1975)
For the present experiment especially, since a single
master list of items was used and the necessity for
relying on a scaling of the items was thus avoided,
it was only essential that the selected "size" order-
ing be consistently and naturally replicated by all
subjects
.
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APPENDIX
Analysis of variance of mean reaction times
(four factor - collapsed across han ) *
-Lnaicates p <
Source d.f
.
F
^ x • o • Hixror
List 3,28 3 . 92 76871 4R 7Q7 k
Day 1,28 121 . 31 158RQ'^7 T7f; k
D X L 3,28 1. 03 1588917 17(=i
Truth 1,28 136 .85 92502 lis *
T X L 3,28
. 19 92502 115
D X T 1,28 12 .41 46713 989 *
D X T X L 3,28 .79 46713.989
Pair 20,560 52 , 33 96624.614 *
P X L 60 , 560 2 . 47 96624 . 614 *
D X P 2 0,560 2 . 16 41121. 554 *
D X P X L 60,560 1 .09 41121.554
T X P 20,560 44 .59 48142 .619 *
T X P X L 60,560 2 . 44 48142.619 *
D X T X P 20,560 2 . 79 31515.787 *
D X T X P X L 60,560 1 .30 31515.787
.05
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